In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he became the fifth consecutive UK leader to take up the role over a six-year span.
Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this represented unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth prime minister in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?
The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his government’s survival.
But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.
Minority Rule
Key background: ever since Macron initiated an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – the left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.
At the same time, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its national debt level and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.
Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.
In September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.
So much so that the following day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.
A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it gently, filled with challenges.
Next, two ex-prime ministers publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down all future administrations unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The leader's team confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.
Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.
With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, scheduled for Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”
Changing Political Culture
The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.
A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.
To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, finished.
Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.
So does an exit exist? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would lose seats, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.
An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.
Polls suggest the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.
Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that cultural shift will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.
“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”
